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Abstract In database applications, access control is aimed at 
requests are mainly formalized by Create, Read, Update and 
Delete (CRUD) expressions. The supervision process can be 
formalized at a high level, such as based on the RBAC model, but 
in the end the relevant aspect is the data being accessed through 
each CRUD expression. In critical database applications access 
control can be enforced not on a CRUD by CRUD basis but 
enforced at the level of sequences of CRUD expressions 
(workflow). This situation can occur whenever established 
security policies are based on strict procedures that define step by 
step the actions (sequences of CRUD expressions) to be followed. 
Current RBAC models do not support this type of security 
policies. To overcome this security gap, we leverage previous 
researches to propose an extension to the RBAC model to control 
for each role which sequences of CRUD expressions are 
authorized. We demonstrate empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of our proposal from a use case based on Java and 
JDBC. Our use case is based on typed security layers built from a 
software architectural model and also from metadata based on the 
proposed RBAC model extension. 
Keywords-information security, access control, RBAC, software 
architecture, software engineering, components. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Access control [1][2] erned with limiting the 
activity of legitimate users [3]. Four of the main strategies for 
regulating access control policies are: discretionary access 
control (DAC) [3], mandatory access control (MAC), attribute-
based access control [4][5] (ABAC) and Role-based access 
control (RBAC) [6][7]. There are other strategies for regulating 
access control, such as credential-based access control (CBAC) 
[Li, '05; Yu, '03], content driven [Moffett, '91; Staddon, '08], 
location driven [Decker, '08], public key driven [Wang, '11] 
and certificate driven [Samarati, '01b]. Each one addresses 
specific security needs for the system under protection. In this 
paper we are focused on RBAC, which has emerged as one of 
the dominant access control policies [8], namely for relational 
database applications. RBAC policies comprise several 
concepts, among them: users, roles (they can be hierarchized), 
permissions, delegations and actions. Basically, legitimate 
(authenticated) users can only execute some action if he has 
been authorized to play the role that rules that action. At the 
end, actions are the four main operations on database objects 
(tables and views) defined by the data manipulation language 
of the SQL standard: Insert, Select, Update and Delete, herein 
referred to as Create, Read, Update and Delete (CRUD) 
expressions, respectively. Depending on the granularity and the 
used technique, the authorization to execute these actions can 
be defined at the level of database objects, at the level of 
columns, at the level of rows and at the level of cells. Another 
relevant aspect that has not been addressed by current RBAC 
models is the sequence in which CRUD expressions are 
executed. Changing the order in which CRUD expressions are 
executed can lead to disclosing not authorized data. For 
example, it is very usual to use values from a previous Select 
expression as runtime values for subsequent Select expressions. 
If this sequence is not enforced, security violations can occur 
because the provenance of the used runtime values cannot be 
guaranteed [9]. To overcome this situation, in this paper we 
propose an extension to the RBAC model to support the 
definition of sequences in which CRUD expressions must be 
executed. We demonstrate empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of our proposal from a use case based on Java and 
JDBC. 
This paper is organized as follows: section II presents the 
related work; section III presents our proposal; section IV 
presents the proof of concept and, finally, section V presents 
the final conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORK 
To the best of our knowledge no other researches have been 
conducted to provide RBAC models with the capability of 
controlling the sequences in which CRUD expressions are 
executed. Therefore, in this section we will present two main 
groups of aspects that are also closely related to this research: 
access control and service composition. 
A. Access Control 
In this sub-section we present access control in two main 
areas: models and techniques.  
Models - Sandhu et at. [10] proposed the RBAC96, which 
comprises four models: RBAC0, RBAC1, RBAC2 and 
RBAC3. Since then, several proposals have been presented to 
extend these four RBAC models, among them we emphasize: 
credential based access control [11], temporal based access 
control [12], role delegation [13][14], context-aware [15], 
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system-to-system [16]. These and the remaining extensions are 
mainly focused on refining the role concept in order to adapt to 
particular contexts and scenarios. 
Techniques - Several techniques have been proposed to 
protect the access to data, among them we emphasize: 
protection at tables and views level (vendors of RDBMS), the 
use of views [17], the use of parameterized views [18], the use 
of query rewriting techniques [19][20][17][21][22], extensions 
to SQL [23][24], programming languages extensions 
[25][26][27], security programming languages and tools 
[28][29][30][23][31] and, finally, semantic access control 
[32][33][34][35][36]. These proposals are based on a bundle 
of different techniques, each one with its own features. In spite 
of their relevance, none of them addresses the key issue of this 
research. They are mainly focused on controlling accesses to 
database objects (tables and views) on a CRUD by CRUD 
basis. A different technique is proposed in [37] where a 
security framework evaluates, at runtime, sequences of CRUD 
expressions in order to preserve data privacy. Beyond 
degrading the system performance this technique still needs to 
be subject to further experimentation. 
Authors of this paper have also published about dynamic 
and distributed access control mechanisms [38][9]. Their 
researches were focused on techniques to implement static 
access control mechanisms at the level of business tiers. They 
were never focused on how to enforce sequences of CRUD 
expressions. 
B. Service Coordination: Orchestration and Choreography 
In our proposed approach, we needed to control the order in 
which users are authorized to use CRUD expressions. Two of 
the technologies that are used to control services workflow are: 
1) service orchestration, which requires every service to be 
requested by a central control point; 2) service choreography, 
which allows a service to request the next service. Standard 
languages for each technique were proposed. Regarding 
orchestration, OASIS defined a standard language, which is 
still very active, called Web Services Business Process 
Execution Language [39] (WS-BPEL). WS-BPEL provides a 
set of functionalities that largely exceeds our needs. We will 
use some functionalities similar to those provided by WS-
BPEL but tailored to our specific needs, such as graphs and 
life-cycle operations of active entities.  Regarding 
choreography, the Web Service Choreography Description 
Language [40] (WS-CDL) is a language from W3C aimed at 
describing choreographies using the global view of the 
observable behavior of web services. However, the W3C Web 
Services Choreography working group was closed in 2009, 
leaving WS-CDL just as a candidate recommendation. 
Several other languages exit, such as Yet Another 
Workflow Language [41] (YAWL) and XML Process 
Definition Language [42] (XPDL), but they clearly would not 
bring any advantage to our case. 
The necessities to control the order in which sequences of 
CRUD expressions are executed are closer to a choreography 
process than an orchestration process. This way, we decided to 
implement our own technical approach in spite of having some 
similar features with the orchestration process, as already 
mentioned. 
III. PROPOSED RBAC EXTENSION 
This section is focused on presenting our RBAC extension. 
We start by presenting some of our previous work that is 
reutilized in this research, then we present the conceptual 
extension to be used in RBAC policies and, finally, a model 
extension is presented. 
A. Business Schema 
Before delving into the policy and its model, we start by 
analyzing some previous researches that we have been 
conducted around CRUD expressions [9][10][11][12][45]. 
From these researches we have defined and used the concept of 
Business Schema, which is basically a model from which 
source code can be automatically generated to handle CRUD 
expressions. The model, as in [9][37], can be driven by access 
control policies. Beyond being a model, Business Schemas 
have a cardinality of many to many with CRUD expressions. 
This means that one Business Schema can handle one or more 
CRUD expressions and one CRUD expression can be handled 
by one or more Business Schemas. Let us consider the next two 
Select expressions: 
1) Select * from table;  2) Select * from table where col>10; 
First we analyze the direction one Business Schema -> 
many CRUD expressions . Both expressions are Select and 
both have zero runtime values and the schema of the returned 
relations is the same. Then, the same Business Schema can be 
shared by both expressions. Now we analyze the direction 
CRUD expression - . This case is 
simpler to explain and we can pick up any of the two Select 
expressions. In cases where different security policies are 
applied to the same Select expression, then we can use the 
Select expression in more than one Business Schema. For 
example, the same CRUD expression is managed by two 
Business Schemas where the runtime values are driven by 
different security policies.  
B. RBAC Policy Extension 
In this sub-section we present the new extension to the 
RBAC policy that is used to control the access requests to the 
data stored in relational database management systems 
(RDBMS). Traditionally, among other concepts, RBAC 
policies comprise: users, roles (they can be hierarchized), 
permissions, delegations and actions. Basically, legitimate (i.e. 
authenticated) users can only execute an action if he is 
authorized to play the role that controls that action. If a user is 
authorized to play a certain role, then he can perform all the 
actions controlled by that role. At the end, actions are the four 
main operations, provided by the Data Manipulation Language, 
on database objects (tables and views): read, insert, update and 
delete.  The extension here presented aims at providing RBAC 
policies with the capability of controlling at the role level: 1) 
which Business Schemas and CRUD expressions are 
authorized; 2) in which sequence Business Schemas can be 
activated (instantiated) and, finally 3) the life-cycle of Business 
Schemas when the sequence moves forward one position. From 
this extension, security experts can now define new restrictions 
over the actions ruled by a role, particularly the ordered 
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sequences of actions (execution of CRUD expressions) users 
can perform. 
C. RBAC Model Extension 
In this sub-section we propose a model, shown in Figure 1, 
to formalize the extension proposed to the RBAC policy. This 
model is not unique and other formalizations can be used, 
depending on the practical scenario at hand. The extension 
herein proposed leverages our previous work where we 
proposed Business Schemas to model the access to relational 
databases based on CRUD expressions. The extension must 
take into account two main aspects. The first aspect is the 
functionality to connect Business Schemas and, therefore, to 
build sequences of Business Schemas. The second aspect is 
related to the life-cycle of Business Schemas when the 
sequence moves forward to the next Business Schema.  
We start by presenting the first aspect. We will use directed 
graphs (usually known as digraphs) theory to formalize our 
approach for sequences (S) of Business Schemas. Basically, 
one vertex (v) is one Business Schema and one directed edge 
(e) connects one vertex (source vertex) to the next vertex 
(destination vertex). From a general digraph, there is the 
possibility to define several paths (sequence of vertices with 
each adjacent pair connected by a single direct edge). In an 
access control context, this type of freedom can raise some 
alerts when applied in systems where security is a key concern. 
Therefore, although our model relies on digraphs, some strict 
constraints need to be enforced. The main restriction lies on the 
impossibility of using diagraphs in their widest scope.  
Nevertheless, we can start by designing digraphs, although, 
from them we have to identify the paths that are considered to 
be in accordance with the access control policies. A path is a 
sequence of vertices, each one with one edge only (except the 
last one, which has no edge). Only these valid paths can be 
used and assigned to roles. This means that users authorized to 
play a role: 1) can only execute the Business Schemas 
(vertices) defined by the associated path and 2) in the order 
they are defined in the path (direct edges). In order to allow the 
assignment of several paths to one role, our model does not 
enforce any restriction at that level. This can be important in 
situations in which a role is defined to control the use of several 
forms, each one controlled with its own path, this way avoiding 
the need to define one role for each form. 
Some definitions are now introduced. A root vertex (r) is 
the vertex where one path start. A leaf vertex (l) is a vertex 
with no edges and, therefore, is the last vertex of a path. A front 
vertex (f) is the vertex in which  the sequence is running.  Now 
we define the properties of paths in our model. Most of the 
concepts are shared by the theory of graphs. Even though, we 
present them to provide the necessary background for those 
who are not comfortable with graphs. The properties of paths 
are: 
 one path comprises one and only one root vertex; 
 one path comprises one and only one leaf vertex; 
 self-edged vertices are not allowed in paths; 
 loop-back vertices are not allowed in paths; 
 any vertex of a digraph can be the root vertex of a path; 
 any vertex of a diagraph can be the leaf vertex of a 
path; 
 any vertex of a digraph can appear zero, one or more 
times in one path; 
 adjacent vertices in paths must also be adjacent vertices 
in the parent digraph and connected with the same 
direct edge. 
Next we present a simple example of a digraph, see Figure 
1. It comprises 5 vertices and 6 edges, one of them is a self-
edge (on vertex C). From this digraph, an indeterminate 
number of different paths can be defined. This indeterminate 
number of different paths has its origin on loop-back vertices 
(B to A) and self-edges (on C). Three of the possible paths that 
can be defined from Figure 1 are shown in Figure 2. 
A B C D
E
 
Figure 1. Example of a digraph. 
A B A E
C C
B C D
 
Figure 2. Examples of valid paths derived from Figure 1. 
The second aspect is related to life-cycle of Business 
Schemas when a sequence moves to the next Business Schema. 
Once again, our approach provides a model in where security 
managers can freely choose the best option for their real 
scenarios. Basically, when the sequence moves to the next 
Business Schema, it is up to the security manager to decide 
which from the active Business Schemas are to remain active 
(their instances run normally) and which are not to remain 
active (their instances are running but they are disabled  
methods do not execute the expected actions). The process to 
disable Business Schemas instances is herein referred to as the 
revocation process. In our model, each Business Schema has an 
associated list with all the previous Business Schemas to be 
revoked. 
Finally, we present a possible and simplified model to 
formalize our proposal, see Figure 3. From it we can see that 
one role comprises one or more sequences (paths); a sequence 
comprises one or more Business Schemas (vertices); each 
Business Schema manages one or more CRUD expressions 
and, finally, each  Business  Schema (vertex - in a certain 
sequence  and   in  a   certain  position)  has  a  list  of  Business 
Schemas to be revoked. 
Role
-sequence
-order
BusinessSchema
-role
Sequence
*
-sequence
-businessSchema
-order
Revocation
*
CRUD
* *
 
Figure 3. Example of a simplified diagram for our RBAC model extension. 
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IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT 
In this section we present the scenario and the technical 
details of our implementation perspective for a RBAC model 
driven by our proposed extension.  
A. Scenario 
We implemented a scenario, which derives from previous 
researches, namely [11][12], where access control mechanisms 
have the following characteristics: 1) they are distributed in 
each client side application as typed security components;  2) 
they are automatically built and updated at runtime in 
3) business logics use Call 
Level Interfaces (CLI) [46], such as ODBC [47] and JDBC 
[48], as the underlying middleware. Figure 4 presents the 
general block diagram for the implemented scenario. Basically, 
distributed security components are built from a metadata kept 
by a RBAC model (that implements our RBAC model 
extension) and modeled by a software architecture model. In 
our proof of concept, the software architectural model derives 
from previous software architectural models, which are closely 
aligned with CLI in order to keep their fundamental properties: 
fine tune control on the interactions with data stores and the use 
of native SQL languages (statements encoded inside strings this 
way keeping the full SQL expressiveness) [49]. 
Automated tool
RBAC Model
Software 
Architectural
Model
Security
Component
 
Figure 4. Implemented scenario general block diagram. 
B. RBAC Model Extension 
Figure 5 presents the implemented RBAC model. Part of it 
has been used in several researches we have conducted around 
distributed access control mechanisms. From the previous 
model we kept: subjects (Sub_Subject), applications 
(App_Applications), sessions (SES_Session), permissions 
(PER_Permission), delegations (Del_Delegation), hierarchized 
roles (Rol_Role), Business Schemas (Bus_BusinessSchema) 
and CRUD expressions (Crd_CRUD). Now, in order to support 
the extension herein proposed, some new entities were 
included: sequences (Seq_Sequence), revocations 
(Rev_Revocation) and aliases for Business Schemas 
(BSA_Alias). This extension clearly derives from the original 
proposal shown in Figure 3, but some additional clarifications 
are required. First of all, we extended the model in order to 
support many to many relational-ships between sequences, 
revocations and Business Schemas. Second, and perhaps the 
most noticeable modification, we included aliases for Business 
Schemas. In spite of not being mandatory, in our particular 
case, the use of aliases for Business Schemas led to significant 
improvements regarding the usability of our model by 
programmers of client applications. We now give the required 
details. From Figure 2 we see that the same Business Schema 
can be used in several vertices of the same path, for example in 
the first path, Business Schema A appears in positions 1 and 3. 
The first one is connected to Business Schema B and the 
second one is connected to Business Schema E. We could have 
built a unique Business Schema for the first path comprising 
edges for both destination Business Schemas. But this 
implementation, in spite of being possible, would require 
programmers to master the correct order of Business Schemas. 
The use of aliases, and also the aim of providing typed security 
components, allow us to instantiate different Business Schemas 
from the same base Business Schema. Basically, the main 
functionalities are shared by all Business Schemas instances 
derived from a Business Schema. The only two differences are: 
1) the connection to the next destination Business Schema and 
2) the list of Business Schemas to be revoked.  
*
Sub_Subject
App_Application
Rol_Role
Bus_BusinessSchema
Crd_Crud
Del_Delegation
Ses_Session
*
1
11
1
1
*
*
*
*1
1 1
1
*
*
*
1
1
Per_Permission
Seq_Sequence
Rev_Rovocation
1 *
*
1
*
1
1
*
BSA_Alias
1 *
*
1
*
1
 
Figure 5. Implemented RBAC model with the proposed extension. 
C. Architectural Model 
In this sub-section we present the software architectural 
model, which is shown in Figure 6, for building automatically 
the enforcement mechanisms from the extended RBAC model. 
The presented architectural model represents the 
implementation of one role only. It is up to each system 
architect to decide how to expand it to support several roles. 
Moreover, it is focused on how to implement RBAC 
mechanisms and not on how to build complete and feasible 
implementations. For example, the architectural model does not 
address key issues such as the scrolling policy on local datasets 
(containers of data returned by Select expressions), sessions 
and database transactions. These and other issues are out of the 
architectural model context.  
Our architectural model comprises three main types of 
entities: Factory, BusinessManager and Business Schemas. 
Next we describe each entity individually. 
Factory - pective, this entity is the 
entry point of our architectural model. Factory contains the 
identification of the first Business Schema of each valid 
sequence in that role. Programmers can select one of the root 
Business Schemas (one for each valid sequence) and also the 
CRUD expression to be executed (methods ). There is 
one type safe method for each pair: root Business  Schema  and 
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each CRUD expression it supports.  
Business Manager - Business  Manager  entity  is   the   key 
entity in our architectural model. It is responsible for three 
main tasks: 1) to ensure that Business Schemas are instantiated 
in the correct order (sequences are kept in sequences); 2) to 
revoke active Business Schemas that are listed in the 
revocation list (SequencyEntry -  revokeList) and, finally, 3) to 
is required because when a Business Schema instance is 
revoked we need to programmatically ensure that all methods 
are put in a disabled state (in Java there is no possibility to 
explicitly destroy objects  they are destroyed by the garbage 
collector only when there is no reference to those objects). 
The interaction between applications and our architectural 
model is as follows (please follow Figure 6): 1 - application 
selects one of the available sequences and requests the 
instantiation of its first Business Schema (in our example 
BusinessSchema_1) to manage the execution of one of the 
authorized CRUD expressions (there is one method for each 
Business   Schema  CRUD  expression    pair);  1.1  
BusinessManager instantiates the Business Schema; 2  
Factory returns (to the application) a reference to the 
instantiated Business Schema 1; 2.1  application uses the 
Business Schema 1 to interact with the host database; 2.1.1  
the call to every method is validated by Business Manager (if 
the Business Schema has been revoked, an exception is raised); 
2.2) application requests the instantiation of BusinessSchema_2 
(this is validated by Business Manager and eventually Business 
Schema 1 is revoked in case it is defined in the revocation list 
of Business Schema 2); 3  Business Schema 2 is instantiated 
(only in case it has been validated by Business Manager) and a 
reference is returned to the application; 3.1  application uses 
Business Schema 2 instance and 3.1.1  every call to its 
methods is validated by Business Manager. 
D. Use Case 
From this architectural model and from metadata based on 
the proposed RBAC model extension, security layers are 
automatically built, see Figure 4. Our use case is based on Java, 
JDBC and uses the Microsoft Northwind database 
(http://www.microsoft.com/download/en/details.aspx?id=23654). 
Table 1 and Table 2 partially present the information used 
in our use case, only for one role (Role_B1). Table 1 shows the 
supported Business Schemas and CRUD expressions. Table 2 
shows the supported sequences. The bottom of both tables has 
some additional information to help with the understanding of  
their content. Now we present some snapshots  of our  concrete 
use case. Only  some  snapshots    will  be   given  in   order  to  
not overcrowd the paper. Figure 7 shows the high level data 
structures (classes are not shown) that were automatically 
created  for  Role_B1  and  from  the  metadata  represented  by 
«uses»
«uses»
-factory : Factory
Application
+getBS1_Select_By_Param1() : BS1
+...()
+getBS1_Select_By_ParamY() : BSy
-businessManager : BusinessManager
Factory
-BS_URL : string
-revokeList : List<string>
-CRUDList : List<string>
SequenceEntry
+instantiateBS(in bs : T) : T
+validateBS(in bs : T) : bool
-sequences : MAP<Integer,List<SequenceEntry>>
BusinessManager+BusinessSChema_1(in bm : BusinessManager)
+getBS2_Select_By_Param1() : BS2
+...()
+getBS2_Select_By_ParamX() : BSx
BusinessSchema_1
+BusinessSchema_2(in bm : BusinessManager)
BusinessSchema_2
End1
End2
«uses»
«uses»
End5
End6
End5
End6
1
2
3
2.1.1 / validate
2.2 / instatiate
1.1 / instantiate
3.1.1 / validate
2.1
3.1
End1
End2
 
Figure 6. Software architectural model for the RBAC extension (one role). 
 
Table 1. Roles, Business Schemas and CRUD expressions. 
Role 
Parent 
 Role 
BS 
CRUD 
Id Ref Expression 
Role_A      
Role_B1 Role_A S_Orders 1 byShipCountry Select * From Orders 
Where CustomerId = ? and 
ShipCountry = ? 
   2 byFreightLimit Select * From Orders 
Where CustomerId = ? and Freight 
< ? 
  I_Orders 3 withCustomerID Insert Into Orders 
Values (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?) 
  S_Customers 4 all Select * From Customers 
Role: Role Reference 
BS: Business Schema alias 
Id: CRUD Identification 
Ref: CRUD reference 
Expression: CRUD Expression 
Table 2. Roles, sequences and revocation lists. 
Role Sequence Position 
Sequence Entry 
BS RL CRUDs 
Role_B1 1 1 S_Customers  4 
  2 S_Orders  1, 2 
 2 1 I_Orders  3 
  2 S_Customers I_Orders 4 
  3 S_Orders  1 
Role: 
Sequence: 
Position: 
BS: 
RL: 
CRUD: 
Role Reference 
The sequence identification 
The position in the sequence 
Business Schema alias 
The revocation list 
The list of authorized CRUDs 
 
Table 1 and Table 2. They comprise the required information 
about the authorized Business Schemas and CRUD expressions 
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for Role_B1, only. These data structures are used during 
instantiation process of Business Schemas as we will show. 
Figure 8 presents the way applications interact with Factory 
classes. Factory classes are also built from metadata based on 
the extended RBAC model and have one method for each pair 
Business Schema  CRUD expression. From Figure 8 we see 
that the pair (Business Schema+CRUD expression) represented 
by S_Customers_all is requested to be instantiated (line 60) and 
then the CRUD expression is executed (line 61). Instances of 
root Business Schemas are instantiated by the Business 
Figure 9 
for the Business Schema S_Customers_all. Here we can see 
that the pair represented by S_Customers_all is s_customers 
and s_customers_S_Customers_all (lines 28, 29), which are 
internal data structures, shown in Figure 7, and, therefore, they  
 
Figure 7. Data structure comprising information about Role_B1 
 
Figure 8. interaction between application and the Factory class. 
 
Figure 9. The Factory requests an instance for a Business Schema. 
 
Figure 10. The root Business Schema provides an edge method to step 
forward to next Business Schema. 
 
Figure 11. Validation process for the instantiation process of Business 
Schemas. 
are not accessible from the application side. In order to access 
the second Business Schema, the root Business Schema 
provides a method to that goal, see Figure 10 (line 65). Before 
being instantiated, Business manager evaluates if the requested 
Business Schema can be instantiated, see Figure 11. If 
authorization is not granted, an exception is raised (line 22-23). 
Otherwise, an instance is returned (line 26-31). 
     These are only some snapshots of our use case. From these 
snapshots, from Table 1 and Table 2, and from Figure 6 we 
hope that readers can infer the remaining technical approaches 
on which our use case was built.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents an extension of the basic RBAC policy 
in order to control the sequence in which CRUD expressions 
are executed. The model leverages previous researches where 
the RBAC model was extended to support the concept of 
Business Schema and, therefore, the execution of CRUD 
expressions. To formalize our proposed extension we start by 
resorting to the theory of graphs. From it we defined an ordered 
sequence of Business Schemas as being a path. Basically, the 
model extension allows security experts to designate the set of 
Business Schemas sequences to be used by users authorized to 
play that role. A proof of concept is also presented, which, once 
again, leverages previous researches. The presented proof of 
concept, beyond providing the empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of our proposal, it also conveys the following key 
advantages: 1) security layers are automatically built and 2) 
security layers are based on typed objects, this way relieving 
programmers of application tiers from mastering the 
established security policies.  
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